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I. Introduction
Canada is a nation of immigrants. Decades of open and compassionate immigration
policies have earned Canada a solid reputation abroad in this regard. However, as long as there
has been immigration in this country, concerns have existed over the impact of immigration on
the labour market and, more importantly, the role that discrimination plays regarding income
differentials. This paper will analyze the earning differentials of immigrants, which shall be
defined as ethnic minorities. The methodology that this paper uses will be, in order to highlight
the issue, a literature review and a regression analysis of earning differentials.
II. The Issue
Immigrants have had a major role in building Canada. Since the Second World War,
Canada has accepted close to 7.8 million immigrants or almost 150,000 annually (Economic
Council of Canada, 1991). From 1990 onwards, the annual intake has been just under 230,000 or
about 0.7% of our population. At this rate, Canada accepts more immigrants and refugees than
any other country, in terms of a percentage of total population. Roughly 4.5 million people,
some sixteen percent of Canada's population of 29 million, are foreign-born (Economic Council
of Canada, 1991). The ethnic composition of the Canadian populace has also changed rapidly.
In 1957, the top ten source countries for immigration were all European, with the United
Kingdom accounting for one-third of the total. Forty years later, in 1997, eight of the top ten
source countries for immigration were non-European. About twenty five percent of Canadian
immigrants now come from Hong Kong, China and Taiwan and about twenty percent from the
Indian subcontinent (Reitz, 1998). With these numbers, the issue of discrimination arises when
immigrants are trying to secure employment within the Canadian labour market. Of all the
immigrants coming to Canada, most fall under the skilled worker category. These are
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immigrants who possess work skills, which are deemed wanted by the Canadian government’s
National Occupational Classification (Hawkins, 1989). Such skills often include technical skills,
in the fields of science and medicine, but also quite frequently labour skills, to fill labour gaps
that the current Canadian population either cannot or is unwilling to fill.
III. Literature Review
The article, “The Colour of Money: Earnings Differentials Among Ethnic Groups in
Canada,” written by Krishna Pendakur and Ravi Pendakur is about the earning differentials
among ethnic groups in Canada. The purpose of their article is to assess the usefulness of the
distinction between white and visible-minority by evaluating ethnically based earning
differentials with respects to white and visible-minority aggregates. This topic is of importance
because there are inherent discrepancies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
the Employment Equity Act such that a “person’s ethnic heritage should not constrain his or her
labour market opportunity” (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998). The Pendakurs point out that there
has been increasing evidence that supports the existence and magnitude of earnings and wage
disparities among ethnic groups in Canada. Also, their paper questions public policy that focuses
primarily on “discrimination against visible minorities instead of discrimination against specific
ethnic groups” (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998). The authors conclude that there are substantial
earning differentials both between and within the white and visible-minority categories.
Interestingly enough, they are trying to show how the “white versus visible-minority
classification system hides ethnically based differences within these aggregate groups”
(Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998). The Pendakurs’ paper also states that differentials between
whites and visible minorities suggest that the visible minority category is a useful indicator of
economic discrimination. Finally, they conclude that policy makers must take care when
3
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discussing ethnicity-based earnings gaps and discrimination to specify whom they mean when
they are talking about the disadvantaged (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).
The results of the Pendakurs’ findings were quite startling. Their analysis demonstrates
that Canadian born visible-minority women and Canadian born white-women all have
approximately equal average earnings (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998). However, immigrant
visible-minority women earn less than all other women. The results also show that the mean
earnings of immigrant white males are higher than those of Canadian born white males.
However, immigrant visible-minority males earn much less than Canadian born white males
(Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998). Lastly, they state that even after controlling for the factors that
typically cause differentials in earnings, there will still be substantial gaps between ethnic
groups. Looking at the different tools of analysis, mainly regressions and the authors’ reasoning,
the results are convincing.
The main drawback of the Pendakurs’ article is that the data presented might not be as
objective as it appears to be at first glance. There are many multi-ethnic and Canadian born
people of multiple ethnic backgrounds; hence, this discussion of race or ethnicity is prone to
subjectivity. For example, workers who claim multiple ethnic origins can say that they are from
a number of different backgrounds. However, the analysis does not fit these sorts of people into
a specific category because the data collected is based upon individual subjectivity. Hence, there
is an element of subjectivity on the part of the individual giving such data. Ideally, the analysis
would try to treat these issues regarding ethnicity and race. If rooting out this subjectivity is not
feasible, then the analysis should discuss discrepancies arising from such subjective data,
perhaps by studying how different permutations of ethnicity would lead to a difference in earning
differentials, all other variables being equal.
4
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The paper written by Howland and Sakellariou, “Wage discrimination, occupational
segregation and visible minorities in Canada”, analyzes the relative economic position of both
immigrants and native-born minorities. This was the first paper of its kind in Canada to analyze
the earnings gap between native-born visible minorities and Canadian-born while considered the
earnings effect of differences in occupational attainment (Howland and Sakellariou, 1993). The
main findings of this paper are that anti-discrimination legislation aimed at decreasing the
earnings gap between visible minority and white women should have a dual focus: it should aim
to reduce inter-occupational wages discrimination and to provide training programmes to widen
employment opportunities for ethnic minority women. Their paper also supports the conclusions
that were reached in the article, “The Colour of Money: Earnings Differential Among Ethnic
Groups in Canada” by Krishna Pendakur and Ravi Pendakur. However, Howland and
Sakellariou examined earning gaps between whites, Asians and blacks and how these disparities
relate to earnings of productivity-related characteristics, wage discrimination and occupational
segregation. Similarly, they did not take into account the subjectivity of the discussion of
ethnicity or race nor have they provided a system whereby this subjectivity can be eliminated to
resolve the discrepancies from arising from such data. Lastly, Howland and Sakellariou discuss
occupational segregation, which the Pendakurs did not deal with.
Christofides and Swidinsky’s article, “Wage Determination by Gender and VisibleMinority Status: Evidence from the 1989 LMAS” analyzes the wage implications for people
distinguished by gender and visible minority status from the 1989 Labour Market Activity
Survey. They examined whether the differences in earnings could be explained by productivityrelated characteristics. Their main finding was that thirty percent of the offered wage
differentials between white males-minority females, white males-white females and white males5
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minority males can be attributed to productivity-related factors (Christofides and Swidinsky,
1994). They also concluded that there were no differences between minority males-white
females and white females-minority females, which can also be explained by productivity factors
(Christofides and Swidinsky, 1994). Even more surprising, the wage differentials between
minority males and minority females are not because of gender or ethnic discrimination but due
to differences in productivity characteristics. Christofides and Swidinsky used a much broader
definition of visible minority than the Pendakurs and there were no categories for multipleethnicity. After consultations with Statistics Canada, Christofides and Swidinsky realized that
the self-identification information was not reliable and should not be used in the analysis of
labour market discrimination. With that in mind, the authors went ahead and used the data, and
thus their results were different from those of the Pendakurs. This difference in data sets shows
how the manner in which results, regarding discrimination with respect to earning differentials,
can change.
Beach and Worswick provide another piece of literature on this issue. “Is there a doublenegative effect on the earnings of immigrant women?” focuses particularly on immigrant
women, a group not closely examined by the above-mentioned authors. This paper investigates
whether immigrant women in Canada have lower earnings than Canadian-born women, in
addition to the conventional findings of gender earning differentials. They highlighted four
major findings. The first is a highly significant determinant of earnings, whose effect clearly
dominates that of more traditional proxies (marital status and number of children) of women’s
time spent outside the labour market (Beach and Worswick, 1993). They found that working
immigrant women reported a slightly higher degree of labour market experience and a smaller
number of children than Canadian-born women and a nine percent higher earnings (Beach and
6
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Worswick, 1993). They also concluded that the earnings differentials were not the same for all
immigrant women. The initial levels of earnings were estimated to be around twelve to fifteen
percent; however, there appeared to be a large double-negative effect for some immigrant
groups, particularly highly educated immigrants. Thirdly, the empirical studies supported the
fact that immigrant wives initially subsidized their husbands’ investments in long run, skillspecific jobs (Beach and Worswick, 1993). Lastly, the adjustment for immigrant women after
coming to Canada does not appear to be statistically significant. This implies that any initial
earnings gap, in relation to Canadian-born women, changes very little over the worker’s career
and may even worsen.
IV. Discussion
A major tenet of the Canadian immigration policy is the selection of immigrants who will
benefit Canada economically because of their skills and abilities, including those who can fill
Canada's immediate labour market needs. Increasingly, these needs reflect Canada's move to a
knowledge-based economy. Immigrants are chosen on the basis of their ability to meet defined
selection criteria, which are derived based upon their propensity to provide Canada with an
adaptable, educated, and professionally experienced work force (Economic Council of Canada,
1991).
Canada's current Immigration Act and Regulations date from 1976 but they have been
amended several times in the last decade to respond to such difficult issues as refugee
determination and inadmissibility (Fagnan and DeVoretz (ed), 1995). The Act is based on
several broad and occasionally inconsistent policy objectives: the attainment of demographic
goals, the enrichment of Canada's cultural and social fabric, the facilitation of family
reunification, the fulfillment of Canada's international obligations and the maintenance of our
7
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humanitarian traditions, the fostering of a strong and viable Canadian economy, the protection of
the health, the preservation of safety in Canadian society, and the promotion of international
order and justice (Reitz, 1998).
The question that must be asked is how these policies affect immigrants’ earnings when
compared to Canadian-born workers. Given that immigrants are selected on the basis of their
ability to meet defined selection criteria, then why do earning differentials exist between
immigrants and the Canadian-born population? The only logical answer would be that
discrimination is the underlying factor within the labour market. Within the economic group of
immigrants, Canada has an active programme to attract entrepreneurs and investors who can
establish or contribute to new and existing businesses and create job opportunities for Canadians.
This seems to be oxymoronic: on one hand, the Canadian government is actively seeking out
those immigrants who can be beneficial to the Canadian labour market. Conversely,
discriminatory policies set by employers have the opposite effect – immigrants become a burden
on the labour market.
Immigrants generally start out in the labour market at a distinct competitive disadvantage,
largely as a result of discrimination in the educational system. However, their handicaps do not
end there; in the labour market itself, this segment of the population does not have an equal
opportunity to make the best of their disadvantaged beginnings.
Discrimination can take several forms. Employment discrimination means that some
people are not hired because of non-economic characteristics such as race and gender. Two
individuals with the same training, education and experience apply for a job. One is an
immigrant of a visible minority group and the other is a Canadian-born who is not a visible
minority. Both can function if placed within the job. If both do not have the same chance of
8
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getting the job, discrimination has entered into the decision-making process. This sort of
discrimination is difficult to identify positively. Differences in unemployment rates among
whites and visible minorities may suggest discrimination, but do not prove that it exists.
Another possible explanation of how immigrants, especially women, are discriminated
against is the theory of occupational segregation (Fellows et al., 1997). This theory holds that
women are crowded into certain jobs. Most women work in occupations that are mainly filled
by women, for example, nurses, bank tellers, and secretaries. While women are not excluded
from other jobs, entry is more difficult. This crowding effect increases supply in lowers wages
in these areas. While labour market segregation may be decreasing, many economists believe
that it is a significant factor in explaining gender-based differences in pay (Fellows et al., 1997).
V. Methodology for Further Research and Analysis – Modeling Strategies and Data Sets
The data set that is used for developing the ideas in this paper is from the 1996 Census
administered by Statistics Canada. This survey contains all the necessary data needed for the
proposed analysis of earning differentials among ethnic groups in Canada. The data set contains
6685 observations for an undefined group. This group contains males and females, of all
ethnicities (none of which were recorded as multiple ethnicities), that reported wages and salaries
in the province of Alberta.
Table 1: Variables:
Variables

Definition

Sample

Standard Deviation

Mean
Province

The province in which the sample size is

48

located, in this case, Alberta

9
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0

Age

The age at which individuals reported at the

38.3466

11.74311

time of the census
Sex

Male or Female

1.54166

0.4982987

Immigran

Immigrant Status Indicator

1.298878

0.4578005

Ethnicor

Ethnic Origin

12.76245

10.963

Highestl

Highest Level of Schooling: the sample size

7.89813

2.655111

29027.83

26103.91

that reported an education above high school
Wagessal

Wages & Salaries reported at the time of the
census

There were some observations that reported missing values. As seen in Appendix 1,
variables that were reporting missing values were dropped. Prior to dropping these missing
variables, the original sample size was 9121. Some of these variables have been transformed.
The categorical variables have been converted into dummy variables. The purpose of the
dummy variable is to control for unobserved, but systematic differences between observations
from different categories. The wages and salaries variable was converted to the logarithm of
wages and salaries, thereby reducing heteroscedasticity if the wages and salaries variable has
heteroscedastic error terms.
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Table 2: Estimating Wage/Earnings Equation:
Independent Variables

Estimated

Estimated

R-

Number of

Coefficients

t-ratio

squared

Observations

Sex

0.50

17.28 (*)

0.1391

6685

Age2

0.00

10.31(*)

0.1391

6685

Immigrant Status Indicator

-0.14

-3.474

0.1391

6685

Ethnic Origin Indicator

-0.19

-4.52 (*)

0.1391

6685

0.1391

6685

(Canadian)
Ethnic Origin Indicator (other
ethnicities, please see Appendix
1 and Appendix 2)
0.62

12.43

0.1391

6685

University: MA

0.72

3.87 (*)

0.1391

6685

University: PhD

0.98

6.02 (*)

0.1391

6685

Highest Level of Education
University: BA

(*) – Indication of a coefficient that is statistically different from 0

The results show that as an individual increases their education, the earning differentials
also increase until they have earned a Ph.D. Also, this shows that the gender and age of an
individual will also determine whether discrimination is a factor in earnings differentials. There
were only nine ethnic minority indicators that had a statistically significant t-ratio; however, not
a single ethnic minority indicator yielded a positive coefficient estimate. The purpose of this
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regression analysis was to construct a model, which would be used to identify the effects of
earning differentials between aggregate groups of Canadians and immigrants of different ethnic
origins. This analysis should determine whether immigrants are faced with earning differentials
in relation to their Canadian counterparts. It can be concluded that the data set does not give any
determinant conclusion as to whether the proposed analysis was able to produce original results
that would contribute to the understanding of this issue.
Looking at the data and its codebook (Appendix 2), it seems that those ethnicities that
reported a statistically significant t-ratio were those ethnicities from Africa, Asia, Latin America
and the Middle East. Those that were not significant were from Europe and the Caribbean.
However, those individuals that reported Canadian as their ethnic origin were faced with an
earning differential of nineteen percent. This may be the case where people considered
themselves to be Canadian instead of the ethnicity of their birth country, for example, a man born
in India considering himself to be Canadian and not Indian.
When looking at the results of other economists, they have either selected against or
failed to test for other things. Christofides and Swidinsky do not mention people that are of
European descent. Likewise, Howland and Sakellariou do not mention anyone other than those
belonging to South East Asian, South Asian or black ethnic groups. Moreover, they do not
examine the differences between people who claim only one ethnic origin and people who claim
multiple ethnic origins. Beach and Worswick only focused on the economic issues facing
immigrant women. Also, the data used by Beach and Worswick came from the 1973 Job
Mobility Survey conducted by Statistics Canada as a supplementary questionnaire to the regular
Monthly Labour Force Survey. Their analysis focused only on earnings and not on any nonmonetary employment benefits for which no data was available. Also, there has been no
12
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apparent attempt to study other forms of discrimination in the labour market such as consumer
and statistical discrimination.
A method that could be used to further decompose the observed wage gaps into two
components would be the Blind-Oaxaca decomposition. The two decomposed components
would be the differences in mean earnings due to differences in mean observable characteristics
and the differences in mean earnings due to different treatment of human capital characteristics.
Many would consider the first component as a legitimate source of wage differentials; however,
the second component would be considered a heinous discriminatory portion of wage
differences. Unfortunately, this regression analysis cannot differentiate human capital
characteristics nor can it look at the mean observed characteristics.
VI. Economic Costs of Discrimination
The economic costs of discrimination are both individualist and societal. The individual
costs of discrimination are those imposed on the individual who loses one way or another
because of discrimination. The social cost of discrimination takes the form of a reduction in total
output of the economy due to discrimination (Fellows et al., 1997).
Individuals that are discriminated against suffer from losses in the form of reduced living
standards. They tend to be paid less for what they sell, to pay higher prices for what they buy, to
have fewer employment opportunities, and to be segregated in low-paying occupations.
Individuals who discriminate may both gain and lose something from their behavior. An
employer practicing discriminatory hiring policies may gain something if a female worker can be
hired at a lower wage than a male worker, assuming that both are equally productive. The wages
of Canadian-born may be kept artificially high if immigrants are shut off from jobs and
occupations because of their status. Discriminators, however, may lose by having to forfeit
13
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income in order to satisfy their taste for discrimination. For example, an individual who refuses
to sell his or her house to a South Asian may end up selling the house at a lower price to a
Canadian-white born person, or an individual who refuses to hire a woman may end up paying a
higher wage to a man with the same productivity. Market imperfections are caused by imperfect
knowledge, immobility of resources, and imperfect competition. That being said, this should not
be mistaken for competitive labour markets, which result in workers of equal ability being
treated equally by an employer. The demand for labour is determined by the employee’s
marginal revenue product; workers who contribute more to their employer’s output and revenues
will command higher wages than those who contribute less. Wage differentials in competitive
markets reflect differences in employee productivity. Such wage differentials should not be
confused with labour market discrimination. Similarly, employers would have very little
incentive to stir up racial and ethnic troubles. Schiller states that profits, politics and to some
extent, recreation command more attention and commitment (Schiller, 1998). If this is the case,
then employers who are participating in a perfectly competitive market will choose not to
discriminate.
Employers who do discriminate against immigrants and minority workers do so because
of statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination, according to Bruce, is defined as
“discrimination in the sense that individuals from the majority group will have a higher
preference to be selected than the minority group, even when there are applicants in the minority
group who would have proven to be as productive as those in the majority group” (Bruce, 1995).
One might ask why this is statistical in nature. According to Bruce, the source of discrimination
is a statistical correlation between the indicator being used to make a hiring decision and the
expected level of productivity” (Bruce, 1995). In reality, employers do not know for sure which
14
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potential employees will turn out to be the most productive. Tests and educational credentials
are used to help reduce such certainty, but if all such screening criteria were eliminated,
employers might rely more on racial characteristics. This proves to be quite problematic for
immigrants. Many immigrants have received their education outside of Canada. Among these
educated immigrants, an important reason for an earnings penalty could be non-equivalence or
non-recognition of academic credentials (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998). Immigrants, who have
gained professional and technical degrees abroad, may face an earnings gap compared with
similarly educated workers with Canadian degrees and certificates because those international
degrees are not recognized or are not equivalent to those gained in Canada. Therefore, if these
professional and technical skills go unnoticed, it may just as well be that Canada is losing a large
portion of its productive and effective workforce. Moreover, an immigrant man who is a part of
a visible-minority and who completed his education in Canada may expect to earn 16.2 percent
less than a Canadian-born white man, even though both have a Canadian education (Pendakur
and Pendakur, 1998).
Immigrants and members of ethnic minorities, especially women, have been pushed into
low-wage occupations. The effect of segregation by occupation is twofold. First, the supply of
labour is increased in occupations restricted to minority groups, which causes a depression of
wages in those occupations. Second, the supply of labour is decreased in occupations closed off
to minority groups, thus increasing wages in those occupations. The result is to create a wider
gap between low- and high-wage occupations.
According to Howland and Sakellariou, differences in the levels of occupational
determining endowment characteristics between Canadian white-born and women belonging to
the Asian ethnic group played a significant role in the earnings disadvantage of these women
15
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(Howland and Sakellariou, 1993). However, occupational segregation had no role in the
women’s earnings gap. They conclude that polices to decrease the earnings differentials between
Canadian white-born and visible minorities by equalizing the ethnic representation across
occupational categories would be effective only for males from black ethnic groups (Howland
and Sakellariou, 1993).
The next question that needs to be answered is why do women, especially those that are
immigrants, fail to enter higher paid male-dominated occupations? First of all, many of these
occupations have a lack of female role models or mentors, which enforces the traditional view of
the division of labour between the sexes. Immigrants, especially those from areas where
traditional roles are acted out to their fullest extent, would find entry to these male-dominated
occupations even more difficult than Canadian white-born females would. The division of
labour within households often leaves women at home to provide domestic services, such as
raising children, whereas men pursue work in the labour market to provide income for the
family. According to Schiller, an explanation for these job and pay discrepancies is the lesser
labour force attached to women (Schiller, 1998). Most working women either start their careers
after having children or interrupt their careers for that purpose. Often, this is the case with
immigrant women. Many immigrant women have left their careers, if they were indeed
employed, back in order to pursue a new life, so to speak, in which these interruptions are
inevitable. Role differentiation and labour-market discrimination tend to reinforce each other.
There are also non-market forms of discrimination, such as social discrimination, that are
present in the labour market. Social discrimination would be difficult to root out, since it is
based on deep-rooted beliefs and customs. In comparison to market discrimination, it would also
be difficult to associate monetary costs with social discrimination. Fellows et al., go so far as
16
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saying that the source of market discrimination is social discrimination and that the self-interest
motive in the market tends to overcome and reduce the effectiveness of discrimination in the
labour market.
VII. Policy Solutions
Policy makers have tried to come up with legislation and regulations in order to eliminate
discriminatory practices from occurring in the labour market. However, these policies are
deemed almost useless because discrimination still flourishes in the labour market. Even though
immigration played an important role in Canada’s history, and it should continue to do so, policy
makers hold the view that there should be some changes. Some people may argue that
immigration must be limited to those who possess the human capital necessary to adjust quickly
and independently to the needs of Canadian society and the job market. Other restrictions they
think Canada should impose include a much tighter and enforced quota system for skilled worker
immigrants, based on Canada’s current employment needs, they should encourage immigration
for the purpose of business, and that Canada should limit immigrant sponsorship (DeVoretz,
1995).
However, these policies are only good for immigrants coming into the country, not for
those who are already participating in the labour market. Policies for landed immigrants should
be multifactorial and should include: education, legislation, government subsidies, and reduction
of discrimination in the development of human capital and occupational segregation.
Educating Canadians, as a whole, would teach them to understand others so that they will
not be predisposed to stereotyped views of ethnicity. Many prejudices are based on stereotypes,
which have little or no basis in fact. This leads to something known as erroneous discrimination,
whereby those who discriminate honestly believe untrue stereotypes, which suggest that the
17
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discrimination is based on objectively valid criteria (Fellows et al., 1997). Beach and Worswick
argued that the lack of language training for women is an important source of female immigrant
earnings degradation (Beach and Worswick, 1993). Conversely, Fagnan stated that female
immigrants are not penalized for not having English as a mother tongue whereas male immigrant
earners are (Fagnan and DeVoretz (ed.), 1995). By providing education to both employers and
immigrants in terms of anti-discriminatory policies would prove to be beneficial.
Another policy solution towards curbing discrimination is the use of legislation.
Legislation, in the hopes of changing peoples’ tastes, would prove to be difficult in reducing
discrimination. However, laws can establish a framework for reducing discrimination. The most
basic set of laws, in Canada, is the Canadian Charter of Rights. In addition, there are provincial
charters to protect human rights and federal and provincial legislation that deals with wage and
employment discrimination. Even though legislation cannot force individuals to change their
prejudices, it can have substantial effects on the way they behave. Legislation can reduce
discrimination if the law increases the cost of discriminating beyond the amount that the
individual is willing to pay. The penalties could include fines or loss of government contracts.
Legislation can also help to deter another form of discrimination – consumer
discrimination. This form of discrimination arises when the consumer forms a bias against a
certain group and refuses to deal with employees of that group. Therefore, immigrants of a
visible-minority may have limited opportunities to get jobs that involve personal contact with
customers (Schiller, 1998). A related concern is the possibility that consumers may believe that
the product of a minority group is of a lesser quality than that of the dominant group (Bruce,
1995). For example, if a substantial proportion of customers have a preference of being served
by or dealing with white staff, employers may refuse to hire employees of another ethnicity,
18
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because such actions could cost them customers. For example, if the law requires all car repair
shops to stop discriminating in their hiring processes, then the prejudiced customer has no choice
but to use the services of any available mechanic, whether white or a member of a visibleminority group.
A third solution for discrimination would be government subsidies. Subsidy payments
would be made to employers who do not practice discrimination in hiring, wages, and
promotions. Employers who discriminate would be sacrificing subsidy payments, thus providing
an incentive not to discriminate. In this case, the opportunity cost of discrimination would be
equal to the subsidy payment. Government subsidy payments could reduce discrimination if the
payments were equal to or greater than the non-monetary gain the discriminator receives from
discrimination.
Policies looking at occupational segregation are quite controversial and are still being
discussed today. As mentioned above, the effects of occupational segregation are twofold.
There are policies similar to affirmative action programmes which encourage the employment of
groups who have historically been discriminated against. However, this sort of programme can
result in “reverse discrimination.” Proponents of such polices claim it is justified as a
counterbalance to existing discrimination (Fellows et al., 1997). This is also where the idea of
role modeling and mentoring comes in. For example, a female professor of engineering would
serve to encourage female students to enter the profession or a black person in the medical
profession may entice other students of similar ethnicity to enter medicine. However, those that
are opposed to such policies claim that reverse discrimination is still discrimination and thus, is
unfair (Fellows et al., 1997).

19
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VIII. Conclusion
The topic of discrimination, as discussed in this paper, is a very broad one. It
encompasses many aspects of Canadian policy towards immigrants and Canadian-born people.
It is also a topic of ongoing research, which has opened many more doors regarding immigration
and discrimination in the labour market. Through the use of legislation, changes in antidiscriminatory behavior and policies will hopefully eliminate, if not curb, the role that
discrimination plays regarding income differentials amongst Canada’s ethnic minority
populations.

20
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Appendix 2:
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata'

[ Data Collection Help ] [ Data Analysis Help ]
[ Data Centre Help ] [ Extraction Help ]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use
Microdata'
USER CODEBOOK
Wed Dec 15 14:11:58 MST 1999
**************************************************
*
*
*
Generated by spss_to_codebook_0.2.pl
*
*
*
**************************************************

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 1
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

PROVP, Province/Territory

Field: 1 Position: 1-2 Format: F2.0
CONTENT
Newfoundland
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Yukon and Northwest

CODE
10
11
12
13
24
35
46
47
48
59
60

SAMPLE
15199
3690
24999
20268
195696
295633
30564
27128
74144
102494
2633

Coverage:
Valid cases 792448 Missing cases 0

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 15
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

AGEP, Age
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Field: 15 Position: 23-24 Format: F2.0
CONTENT
MEAN
MINIMUM
MAXIMUM
RANGE
Not available

VALUE
35.35
0
85
85
98

VALID N

792390

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 16
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

SEXP, Sex

Field: 16 Position: 25-25 Format: F1.0
CONTENT
Female
Male

CODE
1
2

SAMPLE
403335
389113

Coverage:
Valid cases 792448 Missing cases 0

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 22
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

IMMPOPP, Immigrant Status Indicator

Field: 22 Position: 33-33 Format: F1.0
CONTENT
Non-immigrants
Immigrants
Non-permanent Res
Not available

CODE
1
2
3
8

SAMPLE
650346
137603
4498
1

Coverage:
Valid cases 792447 Missing cases 1

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 29
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
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ETHNICRP, Ethnic Origin

Field: 29 Position: 42-43 Format: F2.0
CONTENT
Sgl: British Isles
Sgl: French
Sgl: Dutch
Sgl: German
Sgl: Other W.Europe
Sgl: Hungarian
Sgl: Polish
Sgl: Ukrainian
Sgl: Balkans
Sgl: Greek
Sgl: Italian
Sgl: Portuguese
Sgl: Spanish
Sgl: Jewish
Sgl: Oth Europe (2)
Sgl: Africa (2)
Sgl: Lebanese
Sgl: Other Arab
Sgl: West Asia
Sgl: South Asia
Sgl: Chinese
Sgl: Filipino (2)
Sgl: Vietnamese (2)
Sgl: Oth E/S-E.Asia
Sgl: Lat/Cntl/S Amer
Sgl: Caribbean (2)
Sgl: Aboriginal
Sgl: Canadian

CODE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

SAMPLE
90899
74579
8393
20111
2307
2589
7255
9125
4503
3970
20038
6795
1984
5432
10009
3622
2303
2608
2918
15947
22315
5584
3031
4420
3325
8613
13398
148269

Coverage:
Valid cases 792405 Missing cases 43

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 74
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

HLOSP, Highest Level of Schooling

Field: 74 Position: 90-91 Format: F2.0
CONTENT
< than Grade 5
Grade 5-8

CODE
1
2

SAMPLE
15994
59479

24
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH

Grade 9-13
High School Grad
Trades Cert/Diploma
Oth nonU: No Oth Crt
Oth nonU: with Trade
Oth nonU: with Oth C
Univ: No Cert/Dipl
Univ: With Cert/Dipl
Univ: BA or Prof Deg
Univ: BA + Cert/Dipl
Univ: MA
Univ: PhD
Not applicable

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
99

142364
90169
23104
40526
39286
72319
20566
39972
58017
8713
13841
2885
165213

Coverage:
Valid cases 627235 Missing cases 165213

'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 101
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

WAGESP, Wages & Salaries

Field: 101 Position: 136-142 Format: F7.0
CONTENT
MEAN
MINIMUM
MAXIMUM
RANGE
Not applicable

VALUE
16031.61
0
200000
200000
9999999

VALID N

627235
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